AC-02 (01) Automated System Account Managementac-2.1
Whether an AWS call fetches evidence for this control, and what to run. Its Rev5 baselines, the indicators that reach it and the FedRAMP guidance attached to it open below.
Nothing names itNo recipe names AC-02 (01). 5 reach an indicator it shares, which is adjacency and not coverage — worth reading, not worth recording as evidence for this control.
Collect evidence (0)
Authored AWS recipes whose output is evidence for AC-02 (01). This mapping is this project’s opinion (overlay v3.0.0), versioned separately from the dataset — the upstream FedRAMP rules name none of these tools.
No authored recipe names AC-02 (01). The nearest authored work is below.
Automated account management is a claim about the mechanism that provisions and deprovisions — Identity Center's SCIM provisioning status and its identity-source binding are readable, and that is telemetry. Whether that mechanism is the one every account in the boundary is managed by, and what it is fed from, is an architecture statement. Dropped from two recipes on 2026-08-26 whose key-age assertions were testing IA-05 (g), not this.
A recipe would call:
This project’s assessment (automation register v0.9.0, reviewed 2026-08-26), versioned separately from the dataset and from the evidence overlays. It is an opinion about the AWS surface on that date, and the surface moves.
The KSIs that reach it are KSI-IAM-JIT, KSI-IAM-SUS — that is where the authoring would land. Browse /collect for the whole authored corpus.
Reaches the same indicator, not AC-02 (01)
These recipes prove a KSI that reaches it. None of them claims AC-02 (01) — treat them as neighbours worth reading, not as coverage.
- Active unused-access findings identifying IAM roles, access keys, console passwords, and service/action-level permissions that have not been used within the configured age, driving right-sizing and removal via KSI-IAM-JIT
- Documented just-in-time / break-glass privilege-elevation process backed by IAM Identity Center permission sets and account assignments, showing privileged access is role/attribute-based, time-bound, and approval-gated rather than standing via KSI-IAM-JIT
- The enforced half of who may change what: the service control policy type actually enabled in the organization root, the customer-authored SCPs and the roots, OUs and accounts each one is attached to, and the permissions boundary carried by every principal your own tagging marks as a change authority via KSI-IAM-JIT
- Every identifier the account has issued, with the date it was assigned and the AWS-generated unique id behind it; the workforce identifiers issued through IAM Identity Center and the external issuer each one came from; and the CloudTrail record of identifiers being deleted, which is the only dated evidence of a name becoming free to reuse via KSI-IAM-JIT
- GuardDuty IAM/credential-abuse findings (detection) paired with CloudTrail records of the responsive action taken to disable or secure the affected privileged principal via KSI-IAM-SUS
What NIST requires of AC-02 (01)
The control statement from NIST 800-53 Rev5, verbatim. Square brackets are organization-defined parameters — yours to set, not FedRAMP's to dictate.
Support the management of system accounts using [automated mechanisms].
NIST SP 800-53 Rev5 catalog 5.2.0, from usnistgov/oscal-content at 78650f0. The FedRAMP dataset carries no control text; this is borrowed and pinned.
Rev5 baseline membership
Membership is the whole relationship — a baseline is a set of control ids. Class A carries no baseline at all. The Low/Moderate/High labels are an interpretation from control counts, not a dataset fact.
KSI indicators reaching this control (2)
Under 20x, these indicators are how this control is demonstrated — automated KSI evidence stands in for narrative control evidence.
- IAMKSI-IAM-JITAuthorizing Just-in-Time
A least-privileged, role and attribute-based, and just-in-time security authorization model is used and persistently reviewed for all user and non-user accounts and services.
- IAMKSI-IAM-SUSResponding to Suspicious Activity
Accounts with privileged access are disabled or otherwise secured in response to suspicious activity.
Pages exist for the 209 controls reached by at least one KSI. Baseline-only controls are the orphans on /coverage. Control titles and full text live in the NIST catalog, not this dataset.