AC-05 Separation of Dutiesac-5
Whether an AWS call fetches evidence for this control, and what to run. Its Rev5 baselines, the indicators that reach it and the FedRAMP guidance attached to it open below.
Nothing names itNo recipe names AC-05. 7 reach an indicator it shares, which is adjacency and not coverage — worth reading, not worth recording as evidence for this control.
Collect evidence (0)
Authored AWS and pipeline recipes whose output is evidence for AC-05. This mapping is this project’s opinion (AWS overlay v3.0.0, pipeline overlay v0.8.0), versioned separately from the dataset — the upstream FedRAMP rules name none of these tools.
No authored recipe names AC-05. The nearest authored work is below.
IAM policies and Identity Center permission sets show whether any principal holds two duties at once, so the implementation is measurable; the set of duties that require separation is stated in the SSP, not in AWS.
A recipe would call:
This project’s assessment (automation register v0.9.0, reviewed 2026-08-04), versioned separately from the dataset and from the evidence overlays. It is an opinion about the AWS surface on that date, and the surface moves.
The KSIs that reach it are KSI-IAM-JIT, KSI-PIY-RIS, KSI-PIY-RSD — that is where the authoring would land. Browse /collect for the whole authored corpus.
Reaches the same indicator, not AC-05
These recipes prove a KSI that reaches it. None of them claims AC-05 — treat them as neighbours worth reading, not as coverage.
- Active unused-access findings identifying IAM roles, access keys, console passwords, and service/action-level permissions that have not been used within the configured age, driving right-sizing and removal via KSI-IAM-JITaws
- Documented just-in-time / break-glass privilege-elevation process backed by IAM Identity Center permission sets and account assignments, showing privileged access is role/attribute-based, time-bound, and approval-gated rather than standing via KSI-IAM-JITaws
- The enforced half of who may change what: the service control policy type actually enabled in the organization root, the customer-authored SCPs and the roots, OUs and accounts each one is attached to, and the permissions boundary carried by every principal your own tagging marks as a change authority via KSI-IAM-JITaws
- Every identifier the account has issued, with the date it was assigned and the AWS-generated unique id behind it; the workforce identifiers issued through IAM Identity Center and the external issuer each one came from; and the CloudTrail record of identifiers being deleted, which is the only dated evidence of a name becoming free to reuse via KSI-IAM-JITaws
- The rule requiring the designated owners of the changed code to approve before it merges, the file that names who those owners are, the platform's own report of whether that file actually parses — and, per change, who approved, on which commit, and when. via KSI-PIY-RSDpipeline
What NIST requires of AC-05
The control statement from NIST 800-53 Rev5, verbatim. Square brackets are organization-defined parameters — yours to set, not FedRAMP's to dictate.
a. Identify and document [duties of individuals]; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev5 catalog 5.2.0, from usnistgov/oscal-content at 78650f0. The FedRAMP dataset carries no control text; this is borrowed and pinned.
Rev5 baseline membership
Membership is the whole relationship — a baseline is a set of control ids. Class A carries no baseline at all. The Low/Moderate/High labels are an interpretation from control counts, not a dataset fact.
KSI indicators reaching this control (3)
Under 20x, these indicators are how this control is demonstrated — automated KSI evidence stands in for narrative control evidence.
- IAMKSI-IAM-JITAuthorizing Just-in-Time
A least-privileged, role and attribute-based, and just-in-time security authorization model is used and persistently reviewed for all user and non-user accounts and services.
- PIYKSI-PIY-RISReviewing Investments in Security
The effectiveness of the provider's investments in achieving security goals is persistently reviewed.
- PIYKSI-PIY-RSDReviewing Security in the SDLC
The effectiveness of building security and privacy considerations into the Software Development Lifecycle and aligning with CISA Secure By Design principles is persistently reviewed.
Pages exist for the 209 controls reached by at least one KSI. Baseline-only controls are the orphans on /coverage. Control titles and full text live in the NIST catalog, not this dataset.