AWS IAM Identity Center
What this tool proves, in the authored overlay. Every recipe below names AWS IAM Identity Center; the controls are what their output is evidence for. The mapping is this project’s opinion (overlay v3.0.0) — the upstream FedRAMP rules name no vendor and no product.
Recipes calling AWS IAM Identity Center (6)
- narrativeidentity-center-jit-elevation-workflowquarterly
Documented just-in-time / break-glass privilege-elevation process backed by IAM Identity Center permission sets and account assignments, showing privileged access is role/attribute-based, time-bound, and approval-gated rather than standing
- partialidentity-sources-and-root-credential-lockdownmonthly
Every way a workforce user can authenticate into the account, counted and named in one pass — how many IAM users and federated trusts exist, which SAML and OIDC providers are registered, whether an IAM Identity Center instance is the workforce entry path — together with the state of the two credentials that belong to no person: the root user's access key and the account's X.509 signing certificate
- partialsession-lifetime-and-reauthenticationquarterly
The configured ceiling on how long any credential stays valid before its holder must present an authenticator again — MaxSessionDuration on every IAM role, SessionDuration on every IAM Identity Center permission set, and the aws:MultiFactorAuthAge conditions in policy that expire an MFA-backed session independently of the session itself
- partialidentifier-assignment-and-reuse-preventioncontinuous
Every identifier the account has issued, with the date it was assigned and the AWS-generated unique id behind it; the workforce identifiers issued through IAM Identity Center and the external issuer each one came from; and the CloudTrail record of identifiers being deleted, which is the only dated evidence of a name becoming free to reuse
- partialpersonnel-separation-access-revocationcontinuous
The state of every credential in the account as of a stated moment, the enabled-or-disabled status of every workforce identity in the identity store, and the CloudTrail record of the revocations themselves — the five API calls that actually revoke standing access, each with the time it happened and the administrator who did it
- partialpersonnel-transfer-access-reassignmentcontinuous
What a transferred individual can still reach, and what they have actually used: the reassignment events themselves from CloudTrail (group membership, attached policy, and Identity Center account-assignment changes, each with its time and the administrator who made it), the current Identity Center assignments per permission set, and IAM's service-last-accessed report for the identities involved — a per-principal view of which services the identity is permitted to reach and which of those it has never authenticated to. `iam-access-analyzer-unused-access` answers the same question estate-wide from findings; this answers it for the named principal a transfer is about.
Controls it carries evidence for (8)
The reverse of the join above. A mark here is the control’s own grade across the whole corpus, not its grade from this tool alone — a control this tool partly proves may be fully proved with another.
Tool names are canonical, from data/overlays/aws-services.json and data/overlays/pipeline-tools.json. The two overlays that name services spelled five of them two ways; a page keyed on the raw string would have split those in half.