SC-22 Architecture and Provisioning for Name/Address Resolution Servicesc-22

SC-22 asks two things of the systems that collectively provide name and address resolution: that they be FAULT-TOLERANT, and that they implement INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ROLE SEPARATION. This output answers the second and cannot answer the first. Role separation is a field. Config.PrivateZone marks each hosted zone as serving internal or external resolution, and an architecture where internal names are served from private zones associated with VPCs while public names are served from public zones is exactly the separation the control describes — visible, enumerable, and reviewable on the cadence the indicator asks for. Resolver endpoints are collected beside the zones because they are where the two roles actually meet: an INBOUND endpoint lets on-premises resolvers query into the VPC, an OUTBOUND endpoint forwards VPC queries out, and each one is a crossing point that the zone list alone does not show. Fault tolerance is not a field and is not measurable from your account. Route 53's resilience is a property of AWS's anycast name server fleet, not of your configuration, and no call against your account returns it. It is inherited under the shared responsibility model and evidenced from AWS's own authorization package — say so in the assessment rather than presenting a zone list as though it spoke to availability. The one adjacent thing this output does show is whether YOUR crossing points are healthy, which is what the Status clause below asserts, and that is endpoint health rather than service fault tolerance. Conflating them would be the whole control's failure in one line. A scope edge that decides whether this evidence means anything: name resolution is only separated if the two zone sets actually differ. Two hosted zones for the same domain, one private and one public, is split-horizon DNS and is a legitimate and common pattern — but so is a single public zone answering internal names, which satisfies neither role separation nor the control, and the assertions below cannot tell those apart because the grammar compares a field to a constant rather than one zone's Name to another's. Reconcile the two zone sets by name as part of the review. A private hosted zone also cannot be DNSSEC-signed, which is why signing is a separate recipe and not folded in here. And LinkedService is worth reading before anything is concluded from a zone's presence: a zone created by another AWS service on your behalf is inventory rather than architecture. One KSI only. KSI-SVC-SIN — information secured from unwanted access — is what a private zone does, by keeping internal names off the public resolvers. The recipe does not claim the identity indicator that also reaches this control in the dataset: nothing in these two responses evaluates a permission.