# KSI-INR-RPI — Reviewing Past Incidents

> FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026 v2026.07.14.01 · updated 2026-07-14
> Canonical page: /ksi/ksi-inr-rpi

Theme: Incident Response (`INR`)

## Statement

Past incidents are persistently reviewed for patterns or vulnerabilities that were not previously apparent or identified.

## NIST 800-53 controls it reaches (5)

- `IR-03` (IR) — baselines C, D
- `IR-04` (IR) — baselines B, C, D
- `IR-04 (01)` (IR) — baselines C, D
- `IR-05` (IR) — baselines B, C, D
- `IR-08` (IR) — baselines B, C, D

## Defined terms

- **Incident** — Has the meaning given in 44 USC § 3552 (b)(2) which is "an occurrence that (A) actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information or an information system; or (B) constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of law, security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies."
- **Persistently** — Occurring in a firm, steady way that is repeated over a long period of time in spite of obstacles or difficulties. Persistent activities may vary between actors, may occur irregularly, and may include interruptions or waiting periods between cycles. These attributes of persistent activities should be intentional, understood, and documented; the status of persistent activities will always be known.
- **Vulnerability** — Has the meaning given to "security vulnerability" in 6 USC § 650 (25), which is "any attribute of hardware, software, process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the defeat of [...] management, operational, and technical controls used to protect against an unauthorized effort to adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an information system or its information." This includes gaps in Rev5 Controls and 20x Key Security Indicators, software vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, exposures, weak credentials, insecure services, and all other such potential weaknesses in protection (intentional or unintentional).

## Default artifacts owed by every indicator

- Explanation of measures (and their objectives) that demonstrate the Key Security Indicator, or an explanation of the reason and resulting risk to customers for not having measures available for that Key Security Indicator.
- Explanation of the cycle for any measures that are implemented persistently (if applicable).
- Verification that the measures demonstrate the Key Security Indicator, or that the reason for not having them is accepted.
- Verification that the automation in place is accurate and sufficient to demonstrate appropriate measures for the Key Security Indicator, or that automation is not necessary for each measure.
- Validation that the measures are accurately produced and are in place and working as intended, or that the reason for not having them is valid.